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ESSAY
FROM HOSPITALS TO PRISONS: A NEW
EXPLANATION
Fredrick E. Varst & Shelby B. Calambokidist t
Deinstitutionalization from state mental hospitals was
largely over by 1980, but the percentage of prisoners with
mental illness did not begin to skyrocket until 1990. The
leading theories for the criminalization of mental illness
cannot fully explain this gap.
This Essay offers a new theory: the Supreme Court in
1990 reduced the costs of incarcerating the severely mentally
ill by approving the cheap and easy forced medication of
prisoners. We show that this theory is supported by time-
series and cross-sectional data.
Our theory has implications beyond simply raising the
bar for forcible medication standards in the prison context.
Prison reform litigation increases the costs of incarceration
and puts pressure on states to decriminalize mental illness.
A second deinstitutionalization may be coming.
INTRODUCTION.................................... 102
I. CURRENT THEORIES FOR CRIMINALIZATION.............. 105
A. Under-Reporting Mental Illness....... ..... 105
B. State Hospital Closure... .............. 107
C. Releasing the Sickest Patients Last .............. 108
D. Community-Based Options Dried Up ........... 108
E. Higher Civil Commitment Standards............ 110
F. The War on Drugs......... .............. 110
G. Jail Then Prison.................... ..... 111
H. Diminished Capacity & Insanity..... ...... 112
II. NEw THEORY: WASHINGTON V. HARPER ............ 113
A. The Harper Holding.......... ............ 113
B. National Evidence ....................... 114
C. Alabama Evidence .................. ..... 115
t Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law. J.D. (Yale).
tt J.D. (The University of Alabama School of Law, expected 2017). Ms.
Calambokidis was an intern with the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), which
serves as class counsel for the plaintiffs in the Dunn case. This Essay reflects her
own views and not those of SPLC. Thanks to Elyn Saks for helpful suggestions.
101
CORNELL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol.102: 101
1. Deinstitutionalization & Civil Commitment 115
2. The Mentally Ill Prisoner Population.......... 118
3. Harper in Alabama .................. 120
CONCLUSION ............................................. 124
INTRODUCTION
Jamie Lee Wallace was sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison for shooting and killing his mother only weeks after
being released from a mental hospital on a new medication.'
Jamie suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
ADHD, and intermittent explosive disorder,2 and spent a full
year at a psychiatric hospital after a court initially found him
incompetent to stand trial.3 After entering prison in 2010,
Jamie was placed on suicide watch over 60 times.4 In
December 2016, he was the first to testify in a federal trial
alleging that the Alabama prison system fails to provide
constitutionally adequate mental health care.5 During his
testimony he became so agitated that he had to be removed
from court and the judge asked the attorneys to arrange for an
evaluation. It did not happen in time.6 After testifying, Jamie
was placed on suicide watch for three days, but then released
from observation. He hanged himself two days later.7
Such tragedies are likely to recur given the alarming
number of mentally ill prisoners nationwide.8 A 2005 study
1 Jeremy Gray, The Sad, Short, Violent Life of Jamie Lee Wallace: We Fail
Those Who Most Need Help, AL.COM (Dec. 23, 2016, 7:00 AM),
http: / /www. al.com/ opinion/index.ssf/ 2016/12/the-sadshort violentlife_of.h
tml [https://perma.cc/MC9D-PFFQ].
2 Dunnv. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO), 2016 WL 6949598, at 29* (M.D.
Ala. Nov. 25, 2016).
3 Fifth Amended Complaint at 50, Dunn v. Dunn, No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-
TFM (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2016).
4 Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction Regarding Suicidal Prisoners at 11, Braggs v. Dunn, No.
2:14-CV-00601-MHT-TFM (M.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2016).
5 Gray, supra note 1.
6 Amy Yurkanin, SPLC: Emergency Action Needed After Suicide of Mentally
Ill Alabama Prison Inmate, AL.COM (Dec. 22, 2016, 11:19 AM),
http: / /www. al.com/ news/ index.ssf/ 2016/12/attorneys seek emergency actio.
html [https://perma.cc/2HFB-DDJ3].
7 Gray, supra note 1.
8 See Dahlia Lithwick, Prisons Have BecomeAmerica's New Asylums, SLATE
(Jan. 5, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/jurisprudence/2016/01/pris
ons havebecomewarehousesforthementally i .html
[https://perma.cc/NAG3-JKMF] (noting that in 2012, approximately 356,000
"inmates with severe mental illness were in prisons and jails, while about 35,000
severely ill patients were in state psychiatric hospitals").
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found that 49.2% of inmates in state prisons reported
symptoms of major depressive disorder, mania disorder, or
psychotic disorder.9 Nearly a quarter, 24.3%, had a recent
history of mental health problems, which was defined to
include a diagnosis, an overnight hospital stay, prescription
drug use, or therapy within the year before incarceration.10
The study did not separately assess "severe mental illness," but
15% met the criteria for psychotic disorder." It was not always
like this. "[A] 1930 study of almost 10,000 arrestees reported
that just 1.5 percent of them were psychotic at the time of
arrest."2
Many factors have contributed to the modern mass
incarceration of people with mental illness. A leading
explanation is "transinstitutionalization": the downsizing and
closure of state mental hospitals known as
deinstitutionalization, coupled with patient
reinstitutionalization in jails and prisons-in other words,
shifting the mentally ill from one institution to another. 1
There is clearly some truth to this explanation. 14 But one
under-appreciated gap in this theory is the timing:
deinstitutionalization had slowed dramatically by 1980, but
rapid growth in the percentage of prison inmates with mental
9 Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and
Jail Inmates, B.J.S. SPECIAL REPORT 3 tbl. 1 (Sept. 2006).
1o Id.
11 Id. at 1.
12 E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., MORE MENTALLY ILL PERSONS ARE IN JAILS AND
PRISONS THAN HOSPITALS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 14 (May 2010) (citing W.
Bromberg & C.B. Thompson, The Relation of Psychosis, Mental Defect and
Personality Types to Crime, 28 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 70 (1937))
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/finaljails v hos
pitals study.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/ M93K-F9P3].
13 See Ralph Slovenko, The Transinstitutionalization of the Mentally fIl, 29
OHIO NORTHERN U. L. REV. 641, 654 (2003) (explaining how law enforcement
agencies serve functions previously handled by mental health authorities).
14 See generally Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Assessing the
Contribution of the Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill to Growth in the U.S.
Incarceration Rate, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 188-91 (2013) (graphing yearly data
on mental health patients, of which we extracted values at five-year intervals).
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illness did not begin until after 1990 (Figure 1). '
Figure 1. Hospitals and Prisons
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This Essay evaluates traditional explanations for the
increase in mentally ill prisoners against this timeline (Section
I). Some explanations fit better than others and even in
combination they leave room for other factors. We offer an
entirely new theory (Section II): in 1990, the Supreme Court in
Washington v. Harper,16 by approving lax requirements for
forced medication in prison, made it cheaper and easier for
prisons to manage inmates with severe mental illness. Harper
made mass incarceration of the mentally ill more attractive
than alternatives that may have achieved some success
through the 1980s. We assess this novel theory using national
data and find strongly suggestive support. We then attempt to
confirm the theory by close analysis of a single state, Alabama.
In addition to being one of the worst prison systems in the
country (and not coincidentally), Alabama has a history of
litigation that could provide insights not present in other
states. Our conclusion is that Harper belongs among the cast
of villains, at least in a supporting role.
A brief conclusion follows. Although our project is
primarily historical, it has important implications for today.
Proponents of the transinstitutionalization hypothesis argue
15 Id. at 188 fig.1; TORREY ET AL., supra note 12, at 13 (graphing inmate data
for 1930, 1985, 1990, and 2010, which we reproduced with interpolation).
16 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
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that without increasing the number of inpatient beds-in other
words, rolling back deinstitutionalization-"the criminalization
of large numbers of severely mentally ill persons will
continue."7 Though more inpatient beds surely are needed,
how many? Moreover, a significant reduction in the mentally
ill prison population is unlikely to materialize without
addressing the other factors that have contributed to the
criminalization of mental illness. Harper and prison conditions
more generally may be an important part of the story, largely
absent from the discussion to date. Understanding what
happened in the 1980s and what changed in the 1990s is
crucial in charting the best course forward.
I
CURRENT THEORIES FOR CRIMINALIZATION
A. Under-Reporting Mental Illness
Some have speculated that the surge in mentally ill
prisoners started before 1990, but was not detected due to
poor or nonexistent mental health screening in the criminal
justice system. "It may be that in recent years, correctional
staff have become better able to recognize signs of mental
disturbance and, as a result, refer more of these individuals to
mental health professionals. Thus, better recognition may also
contribute to the prevalence rate of inmates identified as
mentally ill."18 In other words, under-reporting artificially
deflated the 1980 and 1990 data points in Figure 1. Under-
reporting in early periods was no doubt real, but it should be
noted at the outset that it continues in many jurisdictions.'9
The 2000s estimate of 15% is also likely to be an under-count.
Still, there is support for the view that there was significant
under-reporting before the 1990s. A 1986 Bureau of Justice
Statistics report found that around 15% of prisoners had
17 H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, The Shift of Psychiatric Inpatient
Care From Hospitals to Jails and Prisons, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 529, 533
(2005).
18 H. Richard Lamb & Linda E. Weinberger, Persons with Severe Mental
Illness in Jails and Prisons: A Review, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVs. 483 (1998), reprinted
in H. RICHARD LAMB & LINDA E. WEINBERGER, EDS., DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION:
PROMISE AND PROBLEMS 32 (2001); see also SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 101-03 (2003) (noting poor screening and tracking of mentally ill
prisoners); Megan Testa, Imprisonment of the Mentally Ill: A Call for Diversion to
the Community Mental Health System, 8 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 405, 422-23 (2015).
19 See e.g., Dunnv. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO), 2016 WL 6949598, at
*22-23 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 2016) (summarizing the opinion of expert Dr. Kathryn
Burns).
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overnight mental health hospitalization or treatment.20 Of
course, that is not the same thing as currently suffering from
severe mental illness. Other sources are more on point. As
early as 1993, clinical studies suggested that 10-15% of state
prisoners had severe mental illness.2' This is perhaps the best
evidence that the 7 % for 1990 in Figure 1 may be understated.
But this is arguably an apples-to-oranges comparison.
Clinical studies focus on relatively small and perhaps not
representative samples. And even taking the 15% high-end
estimate for 1993, there is strong evidence that this figure
increased dramatically later in the 1990s. A broader 2002
study reported that in 1995, 13 -2 7% of state prisoners suffered
from severe mental illness.22
Data for several states with good information are
consistent with this story. In Texas, "between 1988 and 1998,
the state prison population increased by 262 percent while the
number of mentally ill offenders in prison . . . increased by ...
429 percent."23 In New York prisons, the mental health
caseload has increased by 7 3 % since 1991-five times the
prison population increase.24 In Colorado, the proportion of
20 Richard C. McCorkle, Gender, Psychopathology, and Institutional Behavior:
A Comparison of Male and Female Mentally Ill Prison Inmates, 23 J. CRIM. JUST.
53, 55 tbl.1 (1995).
21 Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 18, at 32.
22 See NAT'L COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF
SOON-To-BE-RELEASED INMATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 24 tbl.3-3 (2002)
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 189735.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CVW4-TFBR] (reporting percentage ranges for prevalence of
state prisoners with schizophrenia/psychosis, major depression, and bipolar
(manic), which were added to calculate the percentage range of state prisoners
with serious mental i lness, assuming perfect overlap (13%) and no overlap (27%)
of illness to account for comorbidity).
The only source we found reporting a constant percentage mentally ill
actually reinforces our point. Frank and Glied list the percentage with serious
and persistent mental illness in correctional institutions at 7% in 1950, 1970,
1990, and 2000. RICHARD G. FRANK & SHERRY A. GLIED, BETTER BUT NOT WELL:
MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1950 127 tbl.7.6 (2006). But
the notes reveal that this "assum[ption]" is based on one 2001 review of the
literature. Id. at 126 (citing Pamela M. Diamond et al., The Prevalence of Mental
Illness in Prison, 29 ADMIN. & POL'Y IN MENTAL HEALTH 21 (2001)). The most recent
U.S. prison study covered by that review was published in 1989. Diamond et al.,
supra, at 27 tbl. 1. It may have been reasonable to assume based on past studies
that the percentage mentally ill would have remained constant between 1990 and
2000, but that is not what happened.
23 Slovenko, supra note 13, at 657 (quoting Elizabeth Daigneau, Criminal
Hospital/Growth in Mentally Ill Prisoners Sparks Debate Over Incarceration us.
Treatment, GOVERNING (Sept. 2002), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-
human-services/ Criminal-Hospital.html [https://perma.cc/HGE5-R3PY]).
24 ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 18, at 19 (citing Mary Beth Pfeiffer,
Mental Care Faulted in Six Prison Deaths, POUGHKEEPSIE J., June 28, 2003, at
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prisoners with major mental illness was 10% in 1998-five to
six times the proportion identified in 1988.25 Between 1993
and 1998 the population of seriously mentally ill prisoners in
Mississippi doubled and it rose by 30% in the District of
Columbia.26 In Connecticut, the number of prisoners with
serious mental illness increased from 5.2 percent to 12.3
percent of the state's prison population from 1991 to 1999.27
In sum, the more persuasive view is that the extraordinary
upsurge began (or at least picked up speed) in the 1990s, since
"[n]ineteen of thirty-one states responding to a 1998 survey
reported a disproportionate increase in their seriously mentally
ill population during the previous five years."28 "While some
portion of the increase may be attributable to improved mental
health screening and diagnosis of mental health problems,
there is a consensus in corrections that the numbers also
reflect a real change in the rate at which the mentally ill are
being sent to prison."29 The post-1990 spike is real.
B. State Hospital Closure
Another alternative explanation for the 1990s upsurge is
the closure of entire state institutions.30 Although the number
of beds had been substantially curtailed by 1980, the number
of admissions declined only slightly.3' Patients were simply
staying for much shorter periods of time. By leveraging even a
few beds for short-term stabilization of the most seriously
mentally ill, state institutions continued through the 1980s to
provide essential gap-filling services. With no inpatient beds
available, jail-often leading to prison-becomes the first
option. One county sheriff explained, "In Alabama, if you (want
to) protect someone from themselves, you charge them with
harassment and put them in jail."32 In our view, the closure of
Al).
25 Id. (citing COLO. DEP'T OF CORR., OFFENDERS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS
(1998)).
26 Id.
27 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & NAT'L INST. OF CORR., PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH
CARE IN PRISONS 5 tbl. 1 (2001).
28 Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 393 (2006) (citing ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note
18, at 19).
29 Id.
30 Seth J. Prins, Does Transinstitutionalization Explain the Overrepresentation
of People with Serious Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System?, 47
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 716, 718 (2011).
31 Id. at 719.
32 Lee Roop, As Alabama Cuts Mental Health Care, Sherffs Say Jails
Overwhelmed, AL.coM (Aug. 8, 2016, 7:24 AM),
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state hospitals is a quite plausible explanation. It has
important implications for moving forward-namely, providing
even a small number of additional inpatient beds could
potentially counteract much of the trend toward incarceration.
C. Releasing the Sickest Patients Last
Some hypothesize that the last patients who left mental
institutions were the least able to survive on the outside and
therefore more likely to end up in jail or prison.3 3 There is
support for this hypothesis. Perhaps the best study of
transinstitutionalization estimated that 4 - 7% of incarceration
growth between 1980 and 2000 can be attributed to
deinstitutionalization.3 4  This is the right-hand tail of
deinstitutionalization when the sickest patients would have
been released.
To fill out this theory, many patients released before 1980
were older and stable enough to live in nursing homes, where
large numbers ended up. This earlier transinstitutionalization
from hospital to nursing home has been well documented.3 5
By 1984, "more than 50% of nursing homes [we]re populated
by persons with primary or secondary diagnoses of mental
disorder."36
This is a good theory, but it cannot be the whole story. The
numbers don't add up. The size of the mentally ill prison
population increased in this timeframe by much more than
4-7%. And, unfortunately, due to data limitations, the study
mentioned above was unable to parse between the 1980s and
1990s. This means that it is impossible to test this theory
against the delayed upsurge that took place.
D. Community-Based Options Dried Up
The lack of community-based mental health treatment
http://www.al.com/news/huntsville/index.ssf/2016/08/alabama-sheriffs-on
thefront.html [https://perma.cc/4UJM-QXFJ].
33 Raphael & Stoll, supra note 14, at 200. Cf Mark R. Pogrebin & Eric D.
Poole, Deinstitutionalization and Increasing Arrest Rates Among the Mentally
Disordered, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 117, 121 (1987) (arguing that community-
based mental health centers geared toward less disturbed clients were
unprepared for the deinstitutionalized seriously and chronically ill patients).
34 Raphael & Stole, supra note 14, at 189-90.
35 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the
Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53,
87 (2011).
36 John A. Talbott, Editorial, Psychiatry's Agenda for the 80s, 251 JAMA
2250, 2250 (1984).
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options surely leads to higher rates of incarceration.3 7 But this
fact alone cannot explain the timing. Community-based
programs had their legs cut out from under them in 1981 when
federal direct support was eliminated and indirect support was
slashed.3 8 This has been described as "probably the biggest
policy mistake of all" in mental health.39 Under the new block
grant approach, "significant community-based treatment
programs failed to materialize on a nationwide basis, and
reform efforts stagnated."4 0 And while the demand for good
community programs outpaced supply during the 1980s,4 1 the
percentage of prisoners with mental illness climbed only
moderately.
On the other hand, two trends in funding may have
exacerbated the situation during the 1990s. First, the
percentage of mental health spending by Medicaid rose from
18.8% in 1991 to 27.4% in 2001.42 "The reliance on Medicaid
funding has shifted the focus of state mental health authorities
toward Medicaid-eligible populations: poor women and
children and those disabled by mental illness . . . ."43 States
may have lost sight of poor men, the group most likely to be
imprisoned.4 4  Second, a new funding entity, the Managed
37 THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF
CONTROL 222 (2d ed. 2010). See generally Paul J. Carling, Major Mental llness,
Housing, and Supports, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 969, 971 (1990) (concluding from
prior studies that "community-based treatment is virtually always as effective or
more effective than hospital-based treatment").
38 CHRIS KOYANAGI, LEARNING FROM HISTORY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO LONG-TERM CARE REFORM 8 (2007).
39 Id. at 19.
40 Bryan Redfern, To Wait or to Litigate? The Ethical Implications of Utilizing
Litigation as a Vehicle for Reforming State Mental Health Care Systems, 29 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1279, 1284 (2016); see also Carling, supra note 37, at 969
(stating in 1990 that "model community support programs are rare"); KOYANAGI,
supra note 38, at 12 ("In 1988, a former state mental health commissioner called
the system fragmented, uncoordinated and disorganized' and reported that a
great deal of federal, state and local money was spent poorly and often in the
wrong places.").
41 Redfern, supra note 40, at 1284; see also Pogrebin & Poole, supra note 33,
at 121 (citing in 1987 "inadequate governmental funding" for community mental
health programs).
42 Richard G. Frank & Sherry Glied, Changes in Mental Health Financing
Since 1971: Implications for Policymakers and Patients, 25 HEALTH AFF. 601, 606
Exhibit 1 (2006).
43 Id. at 609.
44 Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2010,
B.J.S. BULLETIN 7 (Dec. 2011) (reporting that males in 2010 had an imprisonment
rate fourteen times higher than the rate for females); THE REAL WAR ON CRIME:
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION 27 (Stephen R.
Donziger, ed., 1996) (stating that the "majority of the people filling our prisons
come from impoverished backgrounds and lack a formal education").
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Behavioral Health Care Organization (MBHO), started in the
late 1980s to control costs by cutting back on relatively
expensive hospital care and psychotherapy in favor of cheaper
pharmacologic treatment in outpatient settings.4 5 Structured
outpatient programs were lacking. As to the bigger picture,
some commentators conclude that even though the 1990s saw
"larger networks of community-based providers," "insufficient
services" continued.46 In short, we cannot assess the overall
impact of good community-based approaches during this
timeframe because they did not exist widely either before or
after 1990.
E. Higher Civil Commitment Standards
Some blame increased criminalization on more rigorous
requirements for involuntary hospitalization.4 7  This theory
may hold for some marginal cases, but it cannot explain the
trend over time. California in 1969 led the charge by adopting
higher standards,48 and within a decade every state and Puerto
Rico had followed suit.49 Thus, if higher civil commitment
standards were the only source of the problem, rapidly
increasing imprisonment of the mentally ill would have started
no later than 1980. It did not.
F. The War on Drugs
Many argue that the War on Drugs disproportionately
impacts people with mental illness.s0  One commentator
explains, "Due to co-morbidity of drug addiction and mental
illness, when more drug offenders were sentenced to prison,
the number of inmates with mental illness rose."5 1 At least
45 Frank & Glied, supra note 42, at 608.
46 Michael P. Accordino, Dion F. Porter & Torrey Morse, Deinstitutionalization
of Persons with Severe Mental I lness: Context and Consequences, 67 J. REHAB.
16, 17 (2001).
47 BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 37, at 222. See generally Danielle
Laberge & Daphne Morin, The Overuse of Criminal Justice Dispositions: Failure of
Diversionary Policies in the Management of Mental Health Problems, 18 INT'L J.L.
& PSYCHIATRY 389, 389-91 (1995) (suggesting that limited access to social
services and health care are a contributing factor to criminalization of mental
illness).
48 Testa, supra note 18, at 410.
49 Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 18, at 29, 35.
50 BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 37, at 222, 224; Fred Osher & Yu Ling
Han, Jails as Housing for Persons with Serious Mental Illness, AM. JAILS 36, 37
(Mar./Apr. 2002); KOYANAGI, supra note 38, at 10; Arthur J. Lurigio, People with
Serious Mental fIlness in the Criminal Justice System: Causes, Consequences, and
Correctives, 91 PRISON J. (SuPP.) 66S (2011).
51 Testa, supra note 18, at 411-12. But see Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are
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with respect to the war on drugs, the timing at first blush looks
promising: "The 'War on Drugs' was declared in the late
1980s . . . ."2
A closer look, however, reveals a problem with this theory.
The percentage of state prisoners serving time for drug offenses
actually went down between 1990 and 2010.53 It is possible,
of course, that the percentage of drug offenders with mental
illness went up during this timeframe, but it is not at all clear
why that would be. Still, it should be conceded that the
percentage of prisoners with drug offenses rose meteorically in
the 1980s,4 So the War on Drugs could have explained a steep
increase in mentally ill prisoners during that time period. But
again, that is not what we observed.
G. Jail Then Prison
A related theory is that mentally ill individuals receiving
inadequate care in the community were arrested for mostly
minor offenses and sent to jail during the 1980s but not
prosecuted or convicted in large numbers, and therefore they
didn't end up in prison.55 One mechanism by which this might
have happened is harsher treatment of repeat arrestees.6
Perhaps those minor offenses eventually added up and led to
prosecutions. If that were true, the uptick should have
happened sooner.7 Nor can a shift in criminal behavior from
misdemeanors in the 1980s to felonies after 1990 be the
explanation.5 8 But perhaps the most fundamental flaw in this
Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?,
11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 157, 177 (2000) ("Mentally ill inmates are nearly half
as likely to be in prison for a drug related offense than other inmates (12.8%
versus 22.2%) . . . .").
52 Testa, supra note 18, at 405.
53 John Pfaff, The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance,
Limited Legislative Options, 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 181 fig.2 (2015).
54 Id.
55 See Pogrebin & Poole, supra note 33, at 121 (focusing on jail).
56 See Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 17, at 531 (stating that having a
criminal record "may influence the actions of the police in subsequent encounters
with the individual and reinforce the tendency to choose the criminal justice
system over the mental health system"); of. Pogrebin & Poole, supra note 33, at
121 (explaining that the higher arrest rates observed for former mental patients
"is primarily due to the very high rates of subsequent arrest of those patients with
prior arrest records").
57 In one study published in 1985, 92% of jail inmates referred to a mental
health unit had prior histories of arrest. Pogrebin & Poole, supra note 33, at 123.
58 See id. at 123 (reporting that in one jail in the mid-1980s, 75% of those
suspected of mental illness had been arrested for felonies as compared with just
17% for misdemeanors); Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 18, at 30 ("[I]t is clear
that persons who have committed serious offenses, no matter how mentally ill,
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theory is that Figure 1 above includes jail inmates and the
percentage of mentally ill still grew only slowly through 1990.9
H. Diminished Capacity & Insanity
Another theory for the increase in incarceration of the
mentally ill is the contraction or elimination in some states of
the so-called "diminished capacity defense."6 0 In few states is
this actually a defense, but in many states evidence of mental
illness can be introduced by a criminal defendant to negate
mens rea. As of 2006, around thirteen states imposed
significant restrictions on the introduction of such evidence for
this purpose.61 The question for our purposes is when these
restrictions were adopted.
Since one would expect longer sentences to increase prison
populations only after a delay period equal to the previous,
shorter sentence, changes in the 1980s would provide the best
support for this theory. In several states, the restrictions
arguably came too early: Louisiana (1945),62 Arizona (1965),63
Wisconsin (1975),64 D.C. (1976),69 and Delaware (1978).66 In
others, they plainly came too late: Indiana (1996)67 and
Michigan (2001).68 But many other changes fit the timeline:
Florida (1981),69 Georgia (1981),70 Minnesota (1982),"' Ohio
(1982),72 Mississippi (1984),"7 Alabama (1985),74 and Virginia
(1985).75 In sum, one cannot reject the diminished capacity
theory based on timing alone. But it seems very unlikely that
would normally be processed in the criminal justice system.").
59 See supra note 15 and accompanying figure.
60 Lamb & Weinberger, supra note 18, at 40.
61 Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62 State v. Gunter, 23 So. 2d 305, 307 (La. 1945).
63 State v. Schantz, 403 P.2d 521, 524-528 (Ariz. 1965).
64 Hughes v. State, 227 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Wis. 1975)
65 Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 85 (D.C. 1976).
66 Bates v. State, 386 A.2d 1139, 1142-43 (Del. 1978).
67 Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 857-58 (Ind. 1996).
68 People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 280 (Mich. 2001). Michigan
continues to follow this rule, and the Supreme Court continues, unjustly, to
uphold it. Fredrick E. Vars, When God Spikes Your Drink: Guilty Without Mens
Rea, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 209, 209-10 (2013).
69 Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981).
70 Wallace v. State, 282 S.E.2d 325, 329-31 (1981).
71 State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Minn. 1982).
72 State v. Wilcox, 436 N.E.2d 523, 523 (Ohio 1982).
73 Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 720 (Miss. 1984).
74 Neelley v. State, 494 So. 2d 669, 682 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), affd, 494 So.
2d 697 (Ala. 1986).
75 Stamper v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985).
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the national trend can be explained by seven states making it
easier to obtain a long sentence for a fraction of crimes.
Other commentators lay much of the blame on the
contraction of the insanity defense.7 6 Indeed, "[s]eventy-five
percent of all states made some sort of substantive change in
insanity defense in the 1978-85 period."77 That is certainly
enough states to have a potential impact on incarceration of
the mentally ill. The timing is in the ballpark, but perhaps a
bit too early to explain the post-1990 upsurge. And while the
insanity defense benefits people with mental illness almost
exclusively, it did so rarely even before the reforms.78
II
NEW THEORY: WASHINGTON V. HARPER
Existing theories do not seem to provide a full explanation
for the observed trend in the incarceration of people with
mental illness, particularly the rapid increase after 1990. Our
new theory is that the 1990 Supreme Court decision in
Washington v. Harper may have contributed to this upsurge by
reducing the cost of housing mentally ill inmates. This Section
evaluates that theory.
A. The Harper Holding
In the landmark case of Washington v. Harper, the
Supreme Court held that while the involuntary administration
of antipsychotic medication implicates a significant liberty
interest, the regulations permitting such administration need
only be "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests."7 9 Under the Harper standard, a prisoner may be
forcibly medicated where he is deemed a danger to himself or
others and the treatment is in his medical interest, even if the
prisoner has the mental capacity to make treatment
decisions.80 Procedurally, the Court held that due process
does not require a judicial hearing to determine whether a
76 See generally Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using
Therapeutic Jurisprudence toRemediate the Criminalization ofPersons with Mental
illness, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 343, 353-57 (2013) (describing how the
insanity defense has been shrinking).
77 Id. at 355.
78 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 5 (1982)
("Successful invocation of the defense is rare (probably involving a fraction of 1
percent of all felony cases).").
79 494 U.S. 210, 221-24 (1990).
80 Id. at 221-22.
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prisoner meets this substantive standard.8' Rather, it upheld
an internal review procedure.
The new theory advanced in this Essay is that Harper
accelerated the mass incarceration of individuals with mental
illness. By setting the procedural and substantive bars so low
for forced medication of prisoners, Harper significantly reduced
the cost of managing them. We accept that in theory causation
could have run in the reverse direction: the increasing
numbers of mentally ill prisoners produced severe
overcrowding so that only minimal protections were affordable.
However, the timing favors a causal role for Harper. The
beginning of the rapid rise in the mentally ill prisoner
population around 1990 coincides with the Harper decision.
We evaluate this new theory first using national statistics, then
as applied to Alabama.
But before we attempt an empirical assessment, we must
concede an important practical objection at the outset: prisons
have so many ways to coerce prisoners into taking medication
that the legal standards in Harper may be of little relevance.
We have no doubt that coercion is widespread.8 2 A federal
court in Alabama recently found that state prisoner plaintiffs
offered enough evidence to create a dispute of material fact as
to whether "there is a practice of coercing prisoners to take
psychotropic medication and failing to inform them adequately
about their medication."8 3 As the Alabama case demonstrates,
though, sometimes impermissible coercion is detected and the
state must defend itself. The risk of detection becomes a cost
of doing business. Harper reduces that cost by providing a
cheap and easy safe harbor.
B. National Evidence
The national evidence in favor of our theory is both time-
series and cross-sectional. The timing evidence is simple:
Harper was decided in 1990, right before the percentage of
mentally ill in prison started its steep upward trajectory.8 4
That might be a coincidence, but it is a clear advantage over
some of the alternative theories discussed above that do not fit
the timeline as well.
81 Id. at 228, 235.
82 Cf. Fredrick E. Vars, fIlusory Consent When an Incapacitated Patient
Agrees to Treatment, 87 OR. L. REV. 353, 354-57 (2008) (describing flaw in
"voluntary" admissions to psychiatric hospitals).
83 Dunnv. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO), 2016 WL 6949598, at*40 (M.D.
Ala. Nov. 25, 2016).
84 See supra Figure 1.
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The cross-sectional evidence may be more persuasive. Our
analysis of raw data from a 2010 report reveals that the
average odds of a mentally ill person being in jail or prison
versus in a hospital were 3.6 to 1 in states following Harper,
but only 2.7 to 1 in states with more rigorous standards for
forcible medication in prison.8 In other words, states with
higher standards for forcible medication in prison tend to
incarcerate fewer people with mental illness. This is exactly
what our hypothesis would predict.
One objection to this cross-sectional evidence is that it
may omit important confounding variables. To take one
example, perhaps a state's enlightened view toward mental
illness is driving both a lower incarceration rate and the
adoption of high standards for forcible medication. This story
sounds plausible, but it is worth noting that the eighteen
states with standards higher than Harper include Florida,
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia, 86 which one would
not expect to be the most protective of the rights of mentally ill
individuals in other areas. Still, we have no direct test of this
or other omitted variable theories.
C. Alabama Evidence
Alabama was chosen as a case study because its current
regulations are based on Harper and because it has a long
history of litigation that sheds light on its mental health and
prison systems. If a state-level empirical approach fails after a
deep dive into Alabama's history, it is unlikely to succeed in
other states.
1. Deinstitutionalization & Civil Commitment
In 1949, Alabama's two primary mental health hospitals
had roughly 5,732 patients with only ten full-time staff
physicians-"the largest patient load of any state in the nation
at the time."8 7 The state hospital population declined only
85 TORREY ET AL., supra note 12, at 14 tbl. 1 (providing state-by-state ratios);
E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR. & NAT'L SHERIFFS' Ass'N, THE
TREATMENT OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY
27 (2014) (classifying eighteen states as having more rigorous standards for
forced medication than Harper).
86 Id.
87 Bryce Hospital Historic Preservation Project-History Time Line, ALA. DEP'T
MENTAL HEALTH,
http://www.mh.alabama.gov/BryceHospitalProject/history.html
[https://perma.cc/H256-TPVA]. Even in these dire circumstances, patients
found ways to express themselves. See e.g., Fredrick E. Vars, Subversive
Apologia, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 109-12 (2011) (describing a newsletter
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slightly over the next twenty years, and in 1970, Alabama was
spending less on care for persons with mental illness and
intellectual disabilities in public institutions than any other
state.88 The abysmal state of Alabama's mental health care
system led to Wyatt v. Stickney, a federal class action lawsuit
filed on behalf of those involuntarily committed to Bryce
Hospital. In 1971, the court held that persons who are civilly
committed have a constitutional right to treatment and issued
an order requiring the Alabama Department of Mental Health
(ADMH) to bring its state facilities into compliance with certain
constitutional minimum standards.8 9 The Wyatt litigation led
to "a massive shift" of patients out of Bryce hospital and back
into their communities.90
In 1975, the Alabama legislature also enacted more
stringent civil commitment laws.9' These standards were
repealed in 1991, leaving Alabama with a civil commitment
statute that was less stringent than its earlier counterpart, but
still fairly strict.92 Not only does Alabama's current scheme
make it more difficult to civilly commit patients than in the
years before 1974, but it also makes such commitment more
expensive given the procedural protections afforded to the
patient.9 3  Still, the civil commitment standards that existed
between 1975 and 1991 were more protective of patients than
produced by patients at Bryce Hospital).
88 Bryce Hospital Historic Preservation Project History Time Line, supra note
87 (allotting 50 cents a day per patient); Stonewall B. Stickney, The Inception of
Wyatt and the State's Response, in WYATT V. STICKNEY: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
11, 13 (L. Ralph Jones & Richard R. Parlour eds., 1980).
89 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971), affd sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
90 See Meredith Cummings, Changes Loom for Mental Health, TUSCALOOSA
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2003),
http: / /www.tuscaloosanews.com/ article/ DA/20030309/ News/606101038/TL/
[https://perma.cc/6SDM-G3AB]; Harcourt, supra note 35, at 71 ("Because
[Alabama] was unable to meet the judicially-mandated standards of minimally
required care, thousands of patients were released.").
91 In 1974, Alabama's then-existing law was struck down on due process
grounds. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1974). The Alabama
legislature subsequently adopted the procedural and substantive standards
articulated by the Lynch court as the constitutional floor, see id. at 388-97, in
Ala. Code § 22-52-10 (1975). See Walker v. Dancer, 386 So. 2d 475, 477 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1980). The timing of the change in Alabama is consistent with the
overall picture painted above. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
92 See 1991 Alabama Laws Act 91-440 (H.B. 423). The current statute is Ala.
Code § 22-52-10.4.
93 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 22-52-10.5 (inpatient treatment order may not exceed
150 days); id. § 22-52-10.6 (outlining procedure for filing petition of renewal and
requirements of renewal hearing).
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the pre-1975 standard. This heightened protection, along with
the overall lack of mental health funding in the state and the
looming Wyatt injunction governing staff-to-patient ratios in
state hospitals, arguably hindered Alabama's ability (or at least
reduced its incentive) to civilly commit during this time frame.
The Wyatt case-and to a lesser degree, the more stringent
civil commitment standards-radically reduced the patient
population at state mental health facilities.9 4
Deinstitutionalization in Alabama was very rapid in the early
Figure 2. Alabama Public Mental Illness Facilities Census
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1970s, then slow and steady since. By the early 2000s, the
number of patients at Bryce, for example, had dropped to
330.95
Notably, in 1989, the Alabama Supreme Court further held
that involuntary civil commitment, without more, would not
justify the administration of medication without the patient's
informed consent.9 6 By making it harder to forcibly medicate
civilly committed patients, Nolen may have inadvertently
94 See Philip J. Leaf & Michael M. Holt, How Wyatt Affected Patients, in WYATT
V. STICKNEY: RETROSPECT & PROSPECT 73 tbl.3 (L. Ralph Jones & Richard R.
Parlour, eds., 1981); E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., No ROOM AT THE INN: TRENDS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF CLOSING PUBLIC PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS, 2005-2010 22 tbl.1
(2012); E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL
ILLNESS CRISIS app. (1997). The graph reflects yearly data from 1956-1980 and
interpolation between values for 1994, 2005, and 2010.
95 Cummings, supra note 90. The Wyatt standards influenced states across
the country and arguably even international law. Michael L. Perlin. "Abandoned
Love": The Impact of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between International
Human Rights and Domestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121,
124-26 (2011).
96 See Nolen v. Peterson, 544 So. 2d 863, 866 (Ala. 1989).
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turned prison into a financially attractive institutional
alternative only months before the Supreme Court's
endorsement of a policy that made it harder for prisoners to
avoid the unwanted administration of medication.
2. The Mentally Ill Prisoner Population
The percentage of prisoners with mental illness before and
after Harper is much harder to chart. Some studies have
estimated that only 5% of Alabama prisoners suffered from
mental illness in 197 1.97 But the litigation surrounding the
state of the Alabama prison system at the time suggests
otherwise. In 1971, a federal district court in Alabama
considered mental illness to be one of the most prevalent
problems in the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC),
noting than an estimated 10% of inmates were psychotic at the
time and an estimated 60% were disabled enough to require
treatment.98
The final expert report in a 1990s case against ADOC,
Bradley v. Haley, is of particular relevance here because it
details the numerous problems that plagued the system at the
time, such as psychotropic medication being the only
consistently available treatment.99 The experts also found that
medications were improperly administered (and sometimes
even prescribed without the physician ever seeing the inmate)
and required monitoring was often not done.100 According to a
report published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), in
June 2000, 2.5% of Alabama's inmate population was
receiving twenty-four-hour care, 8.4% was receiving therapy or
counseling, and 4.9% was receiving psychotropic
medications.'0' The Bradley expert reports confirm that in
2001, "the mental health services [were] still in crisis," with
only three psychiatrists serving a prison population of over
97 TORREY ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 (relying on an estimate from Alabama's
mental health commissioner).
98 See Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 284 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (finding
the level of mental health staff in the state's prisons to be unconstitutionally low),
aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), and vacated on other grounds, 522
F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1975).
99 ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 18, at 135, 138 (noting that ADOC's
director was informed as such by its private mental health contractor).
100 Id. (internal citations omitted). In addition, the experts found that
medication was not supplemented with adequate therapy or programming in any
facility they visited. Id.
101 See ALLEN J. BECK & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS, 2000 6 (2001) (explaining that the
number of involuntary medication orders was not studied).
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In 2000, the parties in the Bradley case finally reached a
settlement agreement, which in turn incorporated an
agreement of the experts addressing the provision of treatment
to seriously mentally ill inmates, staffing levels, mental health
policies and procedures to be adopted by the ADOC, contract
oversight, and a host of other issues.103 Specifically, the
Bradley agreement stipulated that one of the elements of
adequate treatment for inmates with serious mental illness is
"access to the most effective and appropriate psychotropic
medication recommended by the treating physician,"
accompanied by documentation of informed consent.10 4 Most
importantly, the agreement required ADOC to develop a policy
titled "Administrative Review for Involuntary Psychotropic
Medication (Harper)."0 To that end, the agreement also
required ADOC to produce quarterly logs to the plaintiff's
consultant reflecting the number of incidents of forced
medication as well as the use of the involuntary medication
procedure.106
These provisions of the Bradley agreement are telling
because they suggest that the ADOC did not have a non-
emergency forced medication policy or procedure-or at least
not a constitutionally adequate one-in place prior to 2000.
Indeed, the ADOC did not promulgate this administrative
regulation (AR-621) until 2004.107 AR-621 cites the Bradley
agreement, as well as Harper, as its authority.0 8 While the
substantive standards set out in AR-621 may be more
protective than the constitutional floor set in Harper,09 it is
unclear whether ADOC adheres to its own standards."0
102 ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 18, at 136.
103 Settlement Agreement, Bradley v. Haley, No. 92-A-70-N, August 8, 2000,
at 1-2.
104 Id. at Ex. A, p. 4.
105 Id. at Ex. A, p. 5.
106 Id. at 6.
107 Ala. Dep't ofCorr., Admin. Reg. No. 621 (2004) [hereinafter AR-621].
108 AR-621 §§ V.D, IX.A; see also Expert Report of Dr. Kathryn A. Burns at
40, Dunn v. Dunn, No. 2:14-cv-00601-MHT-TFM (M.D. Ala. July 13, 2016) ("The
non-emergency involuntary medication procedure is supposedly modeled
after ... Harper.").
109 Under AR-621, a prisoner must demonstrate symptoms of serious mental
illness; have been transferred to a SU for less intrusive treatment; have a "high
likelihood of serious harm to self, others or property"; be unable to perform basic
life sustaining functions; and manifest severe deterioration in routine
functioning. AR-621 § V.A.
110 See Dunn v. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT (WO), 2016 WL 6949598, at*39-
*40 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 25, 2016) (finding a dispute of material fact as to plaintiffs
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Procedurally, involuntary medication orders are to be
determined through a true Harper administrative proceeding
by an Involuntary Medication Review Committee."' There is
no judicial review prior to forced medication.
Overall, the lack of data regarding the incarceration rate of
persons with serious mental illness in the 1980s and 90s, let
alone data regarding the number of involuntary medication
orders, at either the national or state level, make it necessary
to rely on Bradley as the main source of information. On the
one hand, Bradley was about the failure to provide mental
health treatment. One might argue that there was a
cost-driven incentive to not provide seriously mentally ill
inmates with psychotropic medication at all, choosing instead
to isolate them for long periods of time with little to no
treatment. Indeed, shortly after the Bradley litigation ended,
Alabama was ranked thirty-fifth among states in expenditures
for mental health care.112 If the ADOC's expenditures on
psychiatric medications were similarly low, then denial of
medication may have been the bigger problem.
On the other hand, Bradley itself, along with the experts'
characterization of ADOC's mental health system as "primitive"
after eight years of litigation,113 suggests systemic abuse. If the
current state of the ADOC is in any way reflective of its state
from 1990 to 2004, then its delivery of mental health services
may have consisted almost entirely of the administration of
medication. 114 The fact that the Bradley agreement required
the ADOC to implement an involuntary medication policy also
suggests that any procedures in place after 1990, when
Alabama arguably had no policy at all, were constitutionally
inadequate, and continued to be constitutionally problematic
even after 2004, when Alabama essentially adopted the Harper
standard.
3. Harper in Alabama
Because Alabama adopted its Harper policy in 2004, one
substantive and procedural due process claims and denying defendants' motion
for summary judgment); id. at *41 (finding another plaintiff created "a material
dispute as to whether his consent on many past occasions has been voluntary,
and as to whether defendants[] have an unconstitutional practice of allowing staff
to coerce prisoners into taking psychotropic medication").
111 AR-621 §V.D.
112 TORREY ET AL., supra note 12, at tbl. 1 (measuring 2002 per capita
expenditures by state mental health authority).
113 ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 18, at 136.
114 See Expert Report of Dr. Craig Haney at 68, Dunn v. Dunn, No. 2:14-cv-
0060 1-MHT-TFM (M.D. Ala. July 13, 2016).
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must look not only at the prevalence of mental illness within
the ADOC post-1990, but post-2004 as well. This Sub-Part will
examine the data regarding the number of prisoners suffering
from mental illness in ADOC facilities.
Between 2004 and 2005, the odds of a person with serious
mental illness being in jail or prison rather than in a hospital
were roughly four to one in Alabama."5 With no solid Alabama
data available for the 2004-2005 year, the authors of this
study based the number of Alabama prisoners with serious
mental illness in jails and state prisons on a national estimate
of 16%.116 According to a BJS special report, over half of state
prisoners nationwide (56%) met the diagnostic criteria for a
mental illness in 2005." Specifically, 43% reported symptoms
meeting the criteria for mania, 23% for major depression, and
15% for a psychotic disorder."8
In 2007, several years after the adoption of AR-621,
ADOC's Commissioner eported that the percentage of inmates
thought to be mentally ill had risen from 5 percent in 1971 to
20 percent. "' Alabama's mental-health commissioner, in
turn, told a state legislative committee on mental health that
"the short and simple answer [was to] get more beds" for
mental-health patients outside of the penal system.120 Yet by
2013, only 12.2% of Alabama prisoners were identified as
having any mental health issue, with 9% taking psychotropic
medications.121
It is hard to believe that the number of prisoners with
115 TORREY ET AL., supra note 12, at tbl. 1. Those odds were greater in only ten
states. Id.
116 Id. The 16% figure used to calculate this ratio is slightly different than the
15% figure later relied upon by the Treatment Advocacy Center as it factors in
the number of Alabama prisoners in jail as well. Compare id. at 7 (citing Henry
J. Steadman et al., Prevalence of Serious Mental Illness Among Jail Inmates, 60
PSYCHIATRIC SERVs. 761, 761 (2009), accounting for the prisoners in jail), with
TORREY ET AL., supra note 85, at 27 (citing JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 9, to
conclude that 15% of inmates have serious mental i lnesses).
117 JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 9, at 1. This is the most recent BJS report on
mental health problems in U.S. prisons and jails.
118 Id.
119 Official Says State Prisons Like A 'Mental Health Center,' NEWS COURIER
(Dec. 21, 2007), http: / /www.enewscourier. com/ news/local news/ official-says-
state-prisons-like-a-mental-health-center/articleb4633aac-a82c-5177-8e16-
99d075989f2d.html [https://perma.cc/6EL7-Z73P].
120 Id.
121 MARIA MORRIS ET AL., S. POVERTY LAW CTR. & ALA. DISABILITIES ADVOCACY
PROGRAM, CRUEL CONFINEMENT: ABUSE, DISCRIMINATION, AND DEATH WITHIN
ALABAMA'S PRISONS 13 (2014) [hereinafter CRUEL CONFINEMENT]. While these
numbers appear to be growing, they have not varied significantly since 2013.
Expert Report of Dr. Kathryn A. Burns, supra note 108, at 23.
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mental illness decreased from 2007 to 2013, especially
considering the 36% cut to Alabama's general-fund mental
health budget during this timeframe.2 2 More importantly, the
2007 and 2013 numbers reported by the ADOC are
dramatically different than the national averages in the most
recent BJS report, showing that in 2005, over half of state
prisoners met these criteria. These differences call into
question the reliability of ADOC's reporting, as "[i]t is highly
unlikely that Alabama's prisoners suffer from mental illness at
just one-quarter of the rate of most state prison
populations."23
To be sure, underreporting by the ADOC also affects the
reliability of its later data concerning the number of prisoners
with serious mental illness (who presumably face greater risk
of forcible medication). In fact, ADOC's own documents
suggest that the acuity of mental illness is understated. For
example, in 2013, roughly 3% of the inmate population was
diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, but less than 1% was
classified as having more than a mild impairment in mental
functioning (i.e., a code greater than "MH-2").1 24 Thus, to the
extent that the number of prisoners with a particular mental
health code is available for the target years in question, these
numbers cannot serve as reliable evidence of the number of
prisoners with severe mental illness at a given time. Instead
of classifying prisoners by the severity of their illness, ADOC's
coding system is apparently based on a prisoner's presumed
housing needs.125
Dr. Kathryn Burns, who also served as an expert in
Bradley, echoed these concerns in her report in the recent case
filed as Dunn v. Dunn, a lawsuit against ADOC. She explains
that while ADOC's private mental health contractor trains its
staff that "10-15% of inmates have mental illnesses but 'not
122 See State Report Card on Mental Health Care, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/01/07/states-mental-
health/ 1805023/ [https://perma.cc/8C2B-NEX3] (reporting results from NAMI
study). In fact, in 2016, Alabama contributed $25 million less to the ADMH than
it did in 2006. Megan Wiebold, The Investigators: How Funding Cuts Have
Impacted Mental Health in Alabama, ABC WAAY 31 (Feb. 14, 2016),
http://www.waaytv.com/appnews/the-investigators-how-funding-cuts-have-
impacted-mental-health-in/article_2c63b79c-dl40-11 e5-8c 11-
c7ebea8f0635.html [https://perma.cc/KT8S-B98Y].
123 CRUEL CONFINEMENT, supra note 121, at 13.
124 Id. at 13-14; see ADOC MENTAL HEALTH SERVS., REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL No.
2013-02, at 98-99 (2013),
http://www.doc.state.al.us/docs/MentalHealthRFP2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LT4R-CZSK] [hereinafter ADOC RFP No. 2013-02].
125 Expert Report of Dr. Kathryn A. Burns, supra note 108, at 26.
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all ... are considered serious,"' there is "simply no reason to
believe that prevalence rates of mental illness and serious
mental illness in ADOC would be any different than rates
found in studies and reported in other states."126 Indeed, there
is even more reason to believe that the prevalence rates are
higher than those found in other state systems "due to the
status of the community treatment system in Alabama when
compared with that in other states."127
Given the shortcomings in ADOC's self-reporting, we
assume that the national averages from 2005 are
representative of Alabama's numbers after the adoption of its
own Harper policy in 2004: approximately 55% male and 73%
female inmates reporting a mental health problem, with 15%
of state prisoners reporting symptoms that met the criteria for
a psychotic disorder.2 8  In 2014, the Treatment Advocacy
Center (TAC) found 15% was still a reasonable estimate for the
number of state prisoners with severe mental illness.129
In sum, it is nearly impossible to gauge the impact of
Harper in Alabama. First and foremost, credible data on the
percentage of prisoners with mental illness are not available,
particularly from before the decision in Harper or its
subsequent adoption in Alabama. Second, Alabama was
apparently applying a standard even lower than Harper both
126 Id. at 24. In her experience in other states, the prevalence rate has been
roughly 25-30% for male inmates, with 10-15% having a serious mental illness,
and 80% for female inmates, with 30% having a serious mental illness. Id.
127 Id.
128 JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 9, at 4.
129 TORREY ET AL., supra note 85, at 27. Dr. Burns relies on this figure from
the 2014 TAC survey in her report. See Expert Report of Dr. Kathryn A. Burns,
supra note 108, at 24. It is worth noting that in defining the percentage of
prisoners who are seriously mentally ill in its methodology, the TAC survey
explicitly states that the average numbers are taken from the 2006 BJS report
and its finding that 15% of prisoners reported symptoms meeting the criteria for
psychotic disorder. TORREY ET AL., supra note 85, at 24. The TAC survey
concludes that this number is still reasonable based on the authors' review of
studies done before and after the BJS report. Id. Importantly, however, both the
Dr. Burns report and the ADOC regulations recognize that serious mental illness
is not limited to psychotic disorder, and includes other disorders such as major
depression, which were included in the 2006 BJS report. See Expert Report of
Dr. Kathryn A. Burns, supra note 108, at 24; ALA. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMIN. REG.
No. 602 (2007) (defining "serious mental illness"); see also supra note 118 and
accompanying text (determining that 23% report symptoms that meet criteria of
major depression). Nevertheless, this potential discrepancy is not fatal. First, if
the authors are basing their finding of "seriously mentally ill" prisoners in 2014
off of the same variable relied upon for 2006 (i.e., symptoms of psychosis), then
we have succeeded in measuring some degree of change from 2006 to 2014.
Second, the national average of 15% for the year 2014 does not deviate
significantly from Dr. Burns' estimates based on her experience in other states.
See supra note 126.
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before and for many years after Harper. For this reason we
would expect the ultimate adoption by Alabama of standards
generally in line with Harper to slow rather than speed up mass
incarceration. Perhaps the most that can be said is that
Harper did not improve the dire situation in Alabama.
More significantly, our frustration in Alabama suggests
that a state-level, empirical approach is unlikely to be an
effective test of our theory. A non-quantitative approach may
have a better chance of success: interviews with long-time
participants in the criminal justice system could shed light on
whether our theory rings true. For example, one could ask a
long-time prison warden whether it is easier to manage
mentally ill prisoners with forced medication than with
alternative methods and whether Harper affected their
practices.
CONCLUSION
The traditional explanations for the mass criminalization
of mental illness leave room for a new theory. Two of the
existing theories happened too soon to explain the upsurge
since 1990: higher civil commitment standards and the war on
drugs. Several states restricted the diminished capacity
defense at about the right time to account for some of the
1990s upsurge. More states limited insanity, but the effect
should have been observed sooner. The lack of good
community-based treatment options is almost certainly an
important factor, but it existed both before and after 1990. The
common explanation that best fits the timing is the shutdown
of state mental hospitals. The number of inpatient beds had
already contracted dramatically by 1980, but the remaining
beds apparently filled an important gap and may have staved
off incarceration for many with severe mental illness. All of
this suggests that adding new inpatient beds and improving
community-based programs hould be high priorities going
forward.
Our new theory-relatively easy forced medication under
Harper-fits the timeline and is supported by current
cross-sectional data showing higher incarceration rates for the
mentally ill in jurisdictions that follow Harper than in
jurisdictions with greater protections. That said, our in-depth
analysis of one jurisdiction, Alabama, demonstrates that a
state-by-state empirical analysis is likely impossible.
Inadequate screening for mental illness and systematic
under-reporting leaves us guessing as to the extent of the
problem in Alabama prisons. Still, we have added to the
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transinstitutionalization literature the notion that decreased
costs associated with mentally ill inmates could exacerbate
over-incarceration. On the flip side, adopting a standard more
exacting than Harper, which we urge states to do, is associated
with smaller mentally ill prisoner populations.13 0
This phenomenon may apply to prison conditions
generally, not just to forced medication. Another significant
legal change in the 1990s was the enactment in 1996 of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (the PLRA), which "undermined
prisoners' ability to bring, settle, and win lawsuits."'13 The rate
of prisoner civil rights filings in federal district court dropped
from 23.3 per 1000 prisoners in 1996 to 15.1 in 1997 and
stabilized around 10 from 2002 to 2012.132 Moreover, the PLRA
had a disproportionately negative impact on prisoners with
mental illness.'3 3 The PLRA may have contributed to increased
incarceration of people with mental illness.
Notwithstanding the PLRA, some mentally ill prisoner
lawsuits are beginning to achieve success. In Brown v. Plata, 134
the Supreme Court held that a court-mandated prison
population limit was necessary to remedy the constitutional
violations created by grossly inadequate medical and mental
health care. This is obviously the direct route to reducing
prison populations. But our analysis of Harper suggests an
indirect route. By simply requiring prison systems to provide
adequate mental health care, prison litigation can exert
financial pressure against over-criminalization. Conditions
inside prison may affect who ends up there, much as the Wyatt
standards helped fuel deinstitutionalization from mental
hospitals across the country.135
Prisons today are as atrocious for people with mental
illness as mental hospitals used to be. 3 6 And the remedies
130 Cf. Stavis, supra note 5 1, at 196, 201 (arguing for easier forced treatment-
indeed, endorsing Harper-but observing that "[i]n simple economic terms, the
more costly the system makes state intervention, the higher the disincentive to
its use or the tendency toward less expensive forms of care").
131 Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters
Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 153 (2015).
132 Id. at 157 tbl.1.
133 Developments in the Law-The Law of Mental Illness, The Impact of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act on Correctional Mental Health Litigation, 121 HARv. L.
REV. 1114, 1145-46 (2008).
134 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011).
135 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
136 Paul Davis, Wyatt v. Stickney: Did We Get It Right This Time?, 35 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 143, 148 (2011) (describing Bryce Hospital as a "hellhole"); SPLC
Begins Trial on Behalf ofAlabama Prisoners with Mental Health Needs, SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER (Dec. 5, 2016),
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sought by plaintiffs in prison reform litigation could be quite
expensive for the state.137  Alternative treatment in the
community may finally be seen as the more attractive option. 3 8
It will be too late for Jamie, but if our theory is correct and if
prison litigation succeeds more broadly, we may incline toward
a second deinstitutionalization-this time from prison rather
than mental hospitals.
https://www.splcenter.org/news/2016/12/05/splc-begins-trial-behalf-
alabama-prisoners-mental-health-needs [https://perma.cc/Q3P4-RSMG]
(quoting expert Dr. Craig Haney on an Alabama prison: "I saw prisoners living in
barren 'Suicide Watch Cells' who had been kept there for months on end, and a
prisoner residing in complete darkness, lying on an office floor in a room labeled
'Mental Health' and urinating in a plastic bucket.").
137 For example, the ADOC in the Dunn case after Jamie's death agreed to hire
one mental health worker for every prison and two for every prison with a mental
health unit, and to provide constant monitoring for prisoners on suicide watch,
an evaluation by a health care professional before release from suicide watch,
and a follow-up visit three days later. Amy Yurkanin, Settlement Reached to
Prevent Suicides in Alabama Prisons, AL.coM (Jan. 13, 2017, 9:06 AM),
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2017/01/settlement-reached toprevent.h
tml [https://perma.cc/9CNH-JWD2].
138 Better policing will also be essential. Compare, e.g., How Memphis has
changed the way police respond to mental health crises, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 7,
2015, 3:19 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/memphis-changed-way-
police-respond-mental-health-crises/ [https://perma.cc/FJ4H-ULBM]
(highlighting the success of Memphis's Crisis Intervention Team in helping police
officers deal with mental health issues in the community), with supra note 33
and accompanying text (discussing the theory that the last patients to leave
mental institutions following deinstitutionalization were the least able to survive
on the outside and therefore more likely to end up in jail or prison).
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